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Abstract
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is often associated with impaired perspective-taking skills. Deception is an important 
indicator of perspective-taking, and therefore may be thought to pose difficulties to people with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen 
in J Child Psychol Psychiatry 3:1141–1155, 1992). To test this hypothesis, we asked participants with and without ASD to 
play a computerised deception game. We found that participants with ASD were equally likely—and in complex cases of 
deception even more likely—to deceive and detect deception, and learned deception at a faster rate. However, participants 
with ASD initially deceived less frequently, and were slower at detecting deception. These results suggest that people with 
ASD readily engage in deception but may do so through conscious and effortful reasoning about other people’s perspective.
Keywords Deception · Perspective-taking · Theory of mind · Autism · Strategy
Introduction
We perceive and interpret the way other people behave in 
order to predict their upcoming actions and adjust our own 
behaviour accordingly (e.g., Dennett 1987; Premack and 
Woodruff 1978; Sellars 1956). Since it is common knowl-
edge that people interpret each other’s actions in this way, 
the possibility of strategic deception (hence, simply, decep-
tion) emerges: we may intentionally carry out an action that 
is likely to be misinterpreted in order to obtain a strategic 
advantage (e.g., Goffman 1959; Harrington 2009).
It is sometimes assumed that deception necessarily 
involves perspective-taking, or, equivalently, having a theory 
of mind (e.g., Premack and Woodruff 1978; Ruffman et al. 
1993). According to this idea, deceivers have to take into 
consideration how others will perceive and interpret their 
actions. Thus, e.g., a poker player may raise, i.e., increase 
the size of the bet, despite being dealt a bad hand of cards 
by reasoning that other players are likely to interpret the 
raise as signifying a good hand of cards—since presumably 
one would not voluntarily play for more money with a bad 
hand of cards. Hence, raising will increase the probability 
of the other players folding, i.e., dropping out of the game 
and losing the bet (Sklansky 2005). In line with this idea, 
the capacity of efficient deception seems to be highly cor-
related with complex social perspective-taking (e.g., Talwar 
and Gordon 2007).
However, deception can also be purely based on social 
learning of causes and effects (e.g., Byrne and Whiten 
1991, 1992). By repeatedly interacting with others, one may 
observe regularities that can subsequently be exploited to 
predict how others will respond to one’s actions. In the case 
at hand, the poker player may simply associate raising with 
an increased probability of folding based on repeated inter-
actions, without actually representing the perspective of the 
other players at all. Such socially learned strategies can serve 
as fast and frugal alternatives to perspective-taking, but also 
as a (compensatory) strategy for explicitly going through the 
normally implicit reasoning steps that underlie perspective-
taking (e.g., Blokpoel et al. 2012; Dienes and Perner 1999).
Perspective-taking and social learning are distinct con-
structs, but they are also importantly interconnected. Thus, 
the development of perspective-taking in children is at 
least to some extent reliant on social learning, as shown, 
e.g., by impaired perspective-taking skills in children who 
have experienced severe social deprivation (e.g., Kreppner 
et al. 1999; Yagmurlu et al. 2005). Conversely, the ability 
to take another person’s perspective provides a scaffolding 
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for streamlining social learning (Heyes and Frith 2014). As 
a consequence of this interconnectedness, certain instances 
of deceptive behaviour may be explained both in terms of 
perspective-taking and social learning.
In spite of this aetiological ambiguity, the ability to 
deceive—and correspondingly the ability to realise that 
one is being deceived—is often viewed as key evidence for 
the presence of perspective-taking abilities (e.g., Ruffman 
et al. 1993; Woodruff and Premack 1979). As Chandler et al. 
(1989, p. 1267) put it:
...any organisms that can be shown to actively distort 
or fabricate information in novel ways specifically 
intended to mislead others into accepting as true what 
they themselves know to be false deserve to have it 
said of them that they subscribe to some theory of 
mind.
Hence, it is predicted that agents with impaired perspec-
tive-taking abilities also show impairments in the ability to 
deceive or detect deception.
People with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are often 
seen as having impaired perspective-taking abilities, i.e., as 
being mind-blind (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1989; Baron-Cohen 
1995; Frith and Happé 1994; Happé 1993). Early studies 
even took mind-blindness to be the defining characteristic 
of ASD (e.g., Happé 1993). However, more recent studies 
have emphasised the important individual differences in 
ASD which are unlikely to be reducible to a single deficit 
(Pellicano 2010; Vivanti et al. 2019). Indeed, several studies 
have shown that in suitable experimental settings high-func-
tioning children and adults with ASD appear perfectly able 
to take other people’s perspectives (e.g.,  Begeer et al. 2010, 
2003; Chevallier 2012). However, even these more nuanced 
studies acknowledge that difficulties with perspective-taking 
are widespread in people with ASD. Hence, people with 
ASD are predicted to have difficulties with deception and 
deception detection.
Experimental data from children with ASD broadly con-
firm this prediction (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1992; Dennis et al. 
2000; Li et al. 2011; Oswald and Ollendick 1989; Russell 
et al. 1991; Sodian and Frith 1992; Yang et al. 2017). To 
illustrate, Baron-Cohen (1992) engaged 15 children with 
ASD (mean chronological age: 15.3, mean mental age: 6.2), 
15 children with learning difficulties who were matched 
for chronological and mental age, and 15 unmatched but 
substantially younger typically developing children (mean 
chronological age: 3.8) in a penny-hiding game (Gratch 
1964). The game consisted of two stages.
In the first stage, the experimenter repeatedly hid a 
penny in one of his hands, and children had to guess the 
location of the penny by pointing at one of the experi-
menter’s hands. Success at this simple game of deception 
detection required avoiding obvious response patterns 
which could easily be exploited by the experimenter. Four 
of the 15 children with ASD failed to do so, and consist-
ently pointed at the same hand over and over again. All 
other children with and without ASD varied their choices 
across trials.
In the second stage, the children took on the role of 
penny-hider. In this stage, successful deception required 
concealing any information that the experimenter could 
exploit to guess the correct hand; e.g., not hiding the penny 
in plain sight and keeping both hands closed when the exper-
imenter was choosing. 10 children with learning difficulties 
and 13 typically developing children succeeded at this form 
of information-occlusion. By contrast, only 2 of the children 
with ASD succeeded at hiding circumstantial evidence that 
allowed the experimenter to determine the location of the 
penny.
The results of this study—as well as all other studies on 
the topic (see references above)—indicate that many chil-
dren with ASD have difficulties with deception. These diffi-
culties are usually connected to their more general problems 
with perspective-taking; e.g., Baron-Cohen attributes these 
problems to the inability of children with ASD to “appreci-
ate someone else’s mental states (such as their thoughts and 
beliefs), and to make sense of and predict their behaviour on 
the basis of such states” (p. 1141).
It is less clear, however, whether the difficulties with 
deception that children with ASD experience persist into 
adulthood; however, the limited evidence that has been 
collected so far suggests that they do. Thus, Happé (1994) 
found that adults with ASD provided less accurate descrip-
tions of the intentions of story characters telling white lies 
or engaging in double bluffs (i.e., actions that are intended 
to appear as a bluff but are actually genuine). In a more 
recent study, Williams et al. (2018) found that adults with 
ASD were significantly less accurate at determining whether 
people in videotaped interactions were lying or not, when 
compared to adults without ASD.
However, in order to accurately detect deception in 
these studies, participants had to rely on their knowledge 
of implicit norms that govern social interactions. Thus, to 
determine that the character in one of Happé’s stories was 
telling a white lie, participants had to represent and integrate 
the social norm that one should always appear grateful when 
receiving a gift. Similarly, in the study of Williams and col-
leagues, participants had to detect subtle facial and linguistic 
cues to establish whether the people in the videotapes were 
lying.
It is well known that people with ASD have problems 
with this type of social reasoning (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 
2001; Deliens et al. 2018; Golan et al. 2006). Hence, it could 
be that the observed difficulties that participants with ASD 
have with deception detection may be due, at least in part, to 
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impaired knowledge of the norms that govern social interac-
tions rather than difficulties with deception per se.
In summary, there is tentative evidence suggesting that 
adults with ASD have difficulties accurately detecting and 
understanding deceptive behaviour, but this evidence stands 
in need of confirmation in an experimental setting that does 
not rely on participants’ knowledge of implicit social norms. 
Moreover, the ability of adults with ASD to actively perpe-
trate deception has—to the best of our knowledge—not been 
studied at all. Hence, this paper reports on an experiment 
that explores the active and passive deceptive abilities of 
adults with ASD in an experiment that does not draw upon 
knowledge of social interactions.
The Task
In order to measure participants’ ability to use and detect 
deception, we engaged them in a game against a comput-
erised opponent (inspired by Yoshida et  al. 2010). The 
deception game differed from previous studies in at least 
two important respects. First, the goal and rules of the game 
were made explicit, so that participants did not have to 
rely on implicit social norms to understand the opponent’s 
behaviour. Second, the behaviour of the opponent was fully 
manifest, so that participants did not have to (in fact, could 
not) attend to subtle cues belying the opponent’s intention. 
In these ways, then, the deception game did not require par-
ticipants to represent and integrate any implicit social norms 
or cues.
An additional feature of the deception game is that people 
with ASD may experience less social anxiety when they 
play a computerised game than when they interact with 
another person, which seems especially pertinent given 
that the interaction involves deception (Bölte et al. 2002; 
Heiman et al. 1995). Conversely, people without ASD may 
perform at elevated levels in socialised settings because they 
are more sensitive than people with ASD to the audience 
effect, i.e., the desire to perform well to enhance their repu-
tation in the eyes of the experimenter (e.g., Chevallier et al. 
2014). For these reasons, we opted for an experimental set-
ting of a less social nature, in that participants played against 
a computerised opponent and were presumably intrinsically 
motivated to obtain a high score rather than by the desire to 
please the experimenter.
Fig. 1  In the Active phase, the opponent (green circle) is unable to 
see the treasure (gray square) and the participant (red circle) moves 
first. Control trials do not involve any deception. In the Deception-
C trial, the treasure can only be captured if the player deceives (i.e., 
moves right) to trap the opponent on the trap tile, which can only be 
escaped from in the direction of the arrowheads. In the Deception-
S trial, the treasure can be captured by moving directly towards the 
treasure (i.e., up) or by first moving down to trap the opponent; but 
the latter option leads to a higher score. In the Passive phase, partici-
pants are unable to see the treasure and the opponent moves first (the 
black arrow). In Control trials, the opponent moves directly towards 
the treasure. In the Deception trial, the opponent first moves away 
from the treasure (i.e., down) to trap the opponent on the trap tile. In 
the Passive phase, trap avoidance was coded as optimal even in Con-
trol trials, in which it did not affect the outcome, because trap avoid-
ance was a superior global strategy and participants had no way of 
telling apart the two trial types, given that they were unable to see the 
location of the treasure
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During the game, participants controlled a red circle that 
could move around a 5 × 5 grid (see Fig. 1). The goal of the 
game was to capture a treasure. The grid also contained a 
computerised opponent. The opponent also tried to capture 
the treasure. The participant and the opponent took turns 
moving. Whoever captured the treasure first was awarded 
a number of points that depended on the distance between 
the treasure and the other player. Hence, participants’ goal 
was to capture the treasure first and maximise the distance 
between the treasure and the opponent. Crucially, the grid 
also contained a trap tile. The trap tile could be accessed 
from all sides, but could only be escaped from in one spe-
cific direction.
The experiment consisted of two stages. During the 
Active stage, participants were told that the opponent was 
unable to see the location of the treasure, and thus relied on 
the participants’ movements to guess where the treasure was 
located. Hence, on critical trials, participants could obtain 
a greater reward by deceptively first moving away from the 
treasure in order to trap the opponent on the trap tile. During 
the Passive stage, the player and opponent switched roles, 
and it was the player who was unable to see where the treas-
ure was located. The opponent was programmed to routinely 
deceive the player by moving away from the treasure in order 
to trap the player on the trap tile. The optimal behaviour for 
the player was thus to consistently avoid entrapment on the 
trap tiles.
Predictions
As noted in the introduction, one can engage in deception 
either by taking the perspective of the other person or by 
social learning of causes and effects, i.e., by exploiting regu-
larities in behaviour that one may observe from repeated 
interactions.
In the context of the game, a perspective-taking player 
may reason as follows: if I move away from the treasure, 
the opponent will interpret that move as evidence that the 
treasure lies in that direction and move accordingly. Doing 
so will trap the opponent and thus allow me to capture the 
treasure. This type of perspective-taking is often thought to 
proceed relatively automatically and effortlessly (Schneider 
et al. 2017).
It has been argued that people with ASD may compensate 
for their hypothesised inability to engage in perspective-tak-
ing by means of social learning strategies (e.g., Dean et al. 
2017; Griffin and Dennett 2008; Happé 1995; Livingston 
et al. 2019). To give an example, someone with ASD may 
compile a list of cues for jokes to make sure they laugh 
when their interlocutor makes a joke they do not understand 
(Livingston et al. 2019). Similarly, players in our experiment 
may engage in strategic deception by exploiting regularities 
that they distill from repeated interactions with their oppo-
nent. Crucially, behaving on the basis of socially learned 
regularities is usually thought to be cognitively taxing when 
compared to perspective-taking (e.g., Hull et al. 2017).
Hence, if we find that people with ASD are less likely to 
deceive or realise that they are being deceived, this would 
provide strong evidence for the mind-blindness tenet that 
people with ASD are unable to to take other people’s per-
spective. However, if we find that people with and without 
ASD are equally likely to engage in strategic deception, 
there are at least two possible explanations. First, it could 
constitute evidence against the mind-blindness theory of 
ASD. Second, as we just discussed, it could be that people 
with ASD compensate for their mind-blindness by using 
socially learned strategies.
Such compensatory strategies may be observed in our 
experiment in at least two ways. First, if people with ASD 
have to distill regularities from the experiment, we may 
expect that there is a stronger learning effect for people 
with ASD than for people without ASD, i.e., that people 
with ASD are initially less likely to deceive or realise they 
are being deceived, but that this difference diminishes over 
the course of the experiment. Second, if strategic deception 
involves conscious reasoning about these regularities, we 
may expect that the use and detection of deception is more 
time-consuming for people with ASD.
Methods
Participants
53 participants were recruited. 27 participants had received a 
prior clinical diagnosis of ASD (13 females, mean age: 33.7, 
standard deviation: 9.4); the remaining 26 participants had 
not (11 females, mean age: 29.4, standard deviation: 8.5). 
The proportions of males and females did not differ across 
the two groups (χ2 < 1). Participants with ASD were mar-
ginally older than participants without ASD (t(51) = 1.77, 
p = .08); however, we did not expect any relation between 
age and deception. The presence or absence of ASD was 
assessed and confirmed for all participants using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2012), 
which was carried out by a research-accredited assessor.
Participants with ASD were recruited from the Autism 
in Context: Theory and Experiment (ACTE) register of vol-
unteers. Participants without ASD were recruited through 
announcements placed on the internet. Study inclusion cri-
teria included: (i) being between 18 and 60 years old, (ii) 
having a global IQ above 70, (iii) having normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and hearing, and (iv) in the case of 
participants without ASD, not having any known psychiat-
ric, developmental, or neurological disorders.
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Participants’ IQ was measured using the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV; Wechsler 2008). There was no 
significant difference between the mean IQs of participants 
with ASD (mean IQ: 119, SD: 16) and without ASD (mean 
IQ: 116, SD: 12; t(51) = 0.8, p = .43). Furthermore, we 
measured participants’ Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2001) and Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright 2004). As expected, the mean AQ was signifi-
cantly higher for participants with ASD (mean AQ: 39, SD: 
5) than without ASD (mean AQ: 14, SD: 6; t(50) = 16.8, 
p < .001); conversely, the mean EQ was significantly lower 
for participants with ASD (mean EQ: 20, SD: 9) than with-
out ASD (mean EQ: 40, SD: 11; t(50) = − 71, p = .001). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the demographic properties 
of the participants.
Materials and Procedure
The deception game took place on a 5 × 5 grid (Fig. 1). Four 
of the tiles were inaccessible. The accessible tiles showed 
(i) a red circle representing the participant, (ii) a green cir-
cle representing the computerised opponent, and (iii) a gray 
square representing the treasure (only in the Active phase, 
see below).
Participants’ goal was to capture the treasure before their 
opponent did. If they succeeded, they received a number of 
points equivalent to the number of steps the opponent would 
need to reach the treasure. Conversely, if the opponent cap-
tured the treasure first, participants lost a number of points 
equivalent to the number of steps they would need to reach 
the treasure. One of the remaining accessible tiles functioned 
as a trap. The trap was represented by three arrowheads. The 
trap was accessible from all sides but could only be escaped 
from in the direction of the arrowheads.
The participant and the opponent took turns moving. 
Both the participant and the opponent could move to any 
accessible, adjacent tile that was either up, down, left, or 
right from the tile on which they were standing. Participants 
registered their movement by pressing the arrow keys on 
their keyboard, and had 10 s to make each move. If they 
failed to make a move within that time frame, they lost their 
turn and the opponent moved. This happened in less than 
1% of the trials. The opponent moved immediately after the 
participant released the movement key, whereupon the par-
ticipant again had 10 s to make the next move. Each round 
ended after either the participant or the opponent captured 
the treasure, or after the participant had made 10 movements 
without anyone capturing the treasure; however, the latter 
never occurred in the experiment.
The experiment consisted of two phases: the Active phase 
and the Passive phase. In the Active phase, the participant 
always moved first. Participants were told (through written 
instructions on the screen) that the opponent was unable to Ta
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see where the treasure was, and therefore had to guess its 
location based on the participant’s behaviour. The opponent 
was programmed so that it always moved in the same general 
direction in which the participant was moving. The opponent 
thus moved in a way that was—at least in principle—com-
pletely predictable, and its behaviour was similar to how one 
might expect a naive person to behave.
The Active phase consisted of two types of trials. In 
Control trials, the optimal path was for participants to move 
directly towards the treasure. In some of these trials, this 
would result in the participant capturing the treasure; in oth-
ers, it was inevitable that the opponent would capture the 
treasure. In Deception trials, the optimal path was to first 
move away from the treasure in order to trap the opponent 
using the arrow tiles. There were two types of deception 
trials: in Deception-C trials, moving directly towards the 
treasure would result in the opponent capturing the treasure. 
In Deception-S trials, participants could capture the treasure 
by either moving directly towards the treasure, or by first 
moving away from the treasure to trap the opponent. How-
ever, the second method yielded a greater payoff, since the 
opponent would be further away from the treasure than if the 
participant moved directly.
There were 7 Control trials and 14 Deception trials (7 
Deception-C trials and 7 Deception-S trials). Hence, the 
Active phase consisted of 21 trials in total. The order of the 
trials was randomised for each participant.
In the Passive phase, the opponent always moved first. 
Participants were unable to see the treasure, and therefore 
had to guess its location based on the opponent’s behaviour. 
However, the opponent would routinely (in two-thirds of the 
trials) deceive participants by moving away from the treasure 
first in order to trap participants by means of the arrow tiles. 
The optimal behaviour from the participants’ perspective 
was thus to consistently avoid being trapped. On Control 
trials, this would lead to a slightly suboptimal outcome; on 
the more frequent Deception trials, however, trap avoidance 
would lead to a vastly superior outcome. Note that partici-
pants were unable to distinguish Control and Deception tri-
als in the Passive phase, since they were unable to see the 
treasure. Hence, both trial types will be grouped together for 
the purpose of analysis.
Figure   1 shows example starting positions for both 
phases. In the example Control trial of the Active phase, 
participants win 5 points by immediately going down. In 
the example Deception-C trial, moving down results in the 
opponent moving left and thus capturing the treasure. In 
order to capture the treasure, participants have to first move 
right and then proceed towards the treasure. In the example 
Deception-S trial, moving up and then right yields 1 point. 
First moving down and then moving towards the treasure 
yields a score of 5. In the example Control trial of the Pas-
sive phase, the opponent moves right and then up twice. 
Irrespective of whether participants move up or right, they 
lose 4 points. In the example Deception trial, the opponent 
first moves down to trap the participant, and then moves up 
again to capture the treasure. In order to capture the treasure, 
participants have to move in the opposite direction from the 
opponent’s initial move.
Participants were first trained to move around the grid. 
Afterwards, they were familiarised with the movement of 
the opponent, and how the opponent’s moves depended 
on theirs. Then, the trap tiles were introduced, and partici-
pants played five training rounds to familiarise themselves 
with the workings of these trap tiles. Then, the treasure was 
introduced, and participants played five rounds to familiarise 
themselves with the scoring system. After that, the Active 
phase started, which was always followed by the Passive 
phase. We did not counterbalance the order of the two phases 
because we intuited that the Passive phase was considerably 
more challenging than the Active phase.
Results
Data Preparation
13 trials were removed because participants failed to move 
within 10 s (0.6% of the trials). In addition, 30 trials were 
removed because the responses failed to register (1.3%).
Behaviour
Behaviour in the Active phase was coded as optimal or sub-
optimal. In Control trials, optimal behaviour was to move 
directly towards the treasure. In Deception trials, optimal 
behaviour was to first move away from the treasure in order 
to trap the opponent. Figure 2 shows the mean percentages 
of optimal behaviour for participants with and without ASD.
To determine whether people with and without ASD 
behaved differently, we constructed generalised binomial 
mixed effects models predicting optimal behaviour based on 
diagnosis (ASD or TD), trial number, age, and IQ, including 
random slopes and intercepts for participants and items (Barr 
et al. 2013). For Control trials and Deception-C trials, there 
were no significant effects of diagnosis (both Z’s < 1). For 
Deception-S trials, however, participants with ASD were sig-
nificantly more likely to behave optimally than participants 
without ASD ( 훽 = −1.69, SE = 0.74, Z = −2.29, p = .022).
Behaviour in the Passive phase was also coded as opti-
mal or suboptimal. Optimal behaviour was to avoid getting 
trapped on the arrow tiles by moving in a different direction 
from the opponent. Participants without ASD were slightly 
more likely to behave optimally than participants with ASD 
(63% vs. 61%). In order to determine if this difference was 
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significant, we constructed a generalised binomial mixed 
effects model predicting optimal behaviour based on diagno-
sis, trial number, age, and IQ, including random slopes and 
intercept for participants and items. There was no significant 
effect of diagnosis ( Z < 1).
One of our reviewers asked for an indication of the sen-
sitivity of our task, i.e., given the number of participants 
and items, differences of which magnitude could likely be 
detected in our experiment? To answer this question, we 
calculated 95% confidence intervals around the parameter 
estimates (Baguley 2009; Levine and Ensom 2012). The 
confidence interval indicates a range in which the popula-
tion mean (i.e., the genuine effect of ASD) is 95% likely 
to occur. In the Active phase, the confidence interval lies 
between −0.02 (i.e., people with ASD are 2% more likely to 
deceive) and 0.11 (i.e., people with ASD are 11% less likely 
to deceive). In the Passive phase, the confidence interval lies 
between −0.02 (i.e., people with ASD are 2% more likely to 
deceive) and 0.08 (i.e., people with ASD are 8% less likely 
to deceive).
Learning
Figure  3 shows the mean percentages of optimal behaviour 
for each trial number.
In order to determine whether participants with and with-
out ASD learned to deceive at different rates in the Active 
phase, we constructed generalised binomial mixed effects 
models predicting optimal behaviour on the basis of diag-
nosis (ASD or TD), trial number, their interaction, age, and 
IQ, including random slopes and intercepts for participants, 
and random intercepts for items, which was the maximal 
converging model.
Figure 3 visually suggests that performance on Control 
trials becomes worse throughout the experiment. However, 
we observed no significant effect of trial number in Con-
trol trials ( 훽 = 0.05, SE = 0.05, t = 1.05, p = .30 ). A pos-
sible explanation for the non-significant downward trend 
may be that as participants became more likely to deceive 
throughout the experiment (see the next paragraph), they 
also became more likely to misapply the deceptive strat-
egy to trials where it was suboptimal. We also observed no 
significant effects of diagnosis or its interaction with trial 
number on Control trials (both Z’s < 1).
For the two types of Deception trials, there was a sig-
nificant interaction between diagnosis and trial num-
b e r  (  훽 = −0.10, SE = 0.04, Z = −2.35, p = .019  ) , 
and  a  s i gn i f i c an t  e f fec t  o f  t r i a l  numbe r 
( 𝛽 = 0.17, SE = 0.04, Z = 4.08, p < .001 ), but no significant 
effect of diagnosis ( 훽 = 1.16, SE = 0.72, Z = 1.62, p = .11 ). 
The significant interaction indicates that, on trials that sug-
gested the use of strategic deception, participants with ASD 
improved to a greater extent throughout the experiment than 
participants without ASD. In visual terms, Fig. 3 thus shows 
that, in the Deception condition, the red line for participants 
with ASD starts below the blue line for participants without 
ASD, but increases more steeply.
In order to locate the source of the interaction effect, 
we also analysed the probability of deception in the first 
and final third of the experiment separately. For the first 
third of the experiment, we observed a significant effect of 
Fig. 2  Frequency of optimal 
behaviour across trial types. 
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diagnosis ( 훽 = 1.03, SE = 0.50, Z = 2.05, p = .04 ), so that 
participants without ASD were more likely to deceive than 
participants with ASD. No significant difference between the 
two groups was observed in the final third of the experiment 
( 훽 = −0.46, SE = 0.45, Z = −1.01, p = .31).
In order to determine whether participants with and with-
out ASD learned to detect deception at different rates in 
the Passive phase, we constructed a generalised binomial 
mixed effects model predicting optimal behaviour on the 
basis of diagnosis (ASD or TD), trial number, their interac-
tion, age, and IQ, including random slopes and intercepts 
for participants and items. There were no significant effects 
of diagnosis or its interaction with trial number (both Z’s 
< 1 ). However, there was a significant effect of trial number 
( 𝛽 = 0.19, SE = 0.04, Z = 5.33, p < .001).
Response times
Figure  4 shows the mean response times for optimal and 
suboptimal movements.
In the Active phase, the first movement always indicated 
whether participants engaged in strategic deception or not. 
In order to analyse response times for these first movements 
in the Active phase, we constructed linear regression mixed 
effects models predicting logarithmised response times 
based on diagnosis (ASD or TD), behaviour (optimal or sub-
optimal), their interaction, trial number, age, and IQ, includ-
ing random intercepts for participants and items, which was 
the maximally converging model.
For the Control trials, there were no significant effects 
of diagnosis or its interaction with behaviour (both t’s 
< 1 ). However, there was a marginally significant effect 
of behaviour ( 훽 = −0.16, SE = 0.10, t = −1.70, p = .09 ), 
indicating marginally slower responses when partici-
pants behaved suboptimally. For the trials involving 
deception, there were also no significant effects of diag-
nosis or its interaction with behaviour (both t’s < 1 ). 
However, there was a significant effect of behaviour 
( 𝛽 = −0.30, SE = 0.05, t = 5.78, p < .001 ), such that par-
ticipants were significantly slower when they behaved opti-
mally, i.e., when they engaged in strategic deception than 
when they did not.
For the Passive phase, we concentrate on those moves 
that indicate that participants avoided entrapment. In most 
cases, this was the first move that participants made, but 
it could also be the second or third move if the arrow tile 
was further away from the participant’s starting position. 
To analyse response times for these moves, we constructed 
a linear regression mixed effects models predicting loga-
rithmised response times based on diagnosis (ASD or TD), 
behaviour (optimal or suboptimal), their interaction, trial 
number, age, and IQ, including random intercepts for par-
ticipants and items.
There was a significant interaction between behaviour 
and diagnosis ( 훽 = −0.26, SE = 0.09, t = −2.84, p = .005 ), 
a n d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  o f  b e h av i o u r 
( 𝛽 = −0.32, SE = 0.07, t = 4.76, p < .001 ), but no significant 
effect of diagnosis ( 훽 = 0.22, SE = 0.14, t = 1.57, p = .12 ). 
The significant interaction indicates that participants with 
ASD showed a different response time pattern than partici-
pants without ASD. In visual terms, Fig.  4 thus shows a 
crossed interaction effect between behaviour and diagnosis.
In order to locate the source of the interaction, we car-
ried out follow-up analyses for each participant group 
separately. These analyses indicate that, whereas par-
ticipants without ASD were equally fast in their opti-
mal and suboptimal behaviour (t < 1 ), participants with 
ASD were significantly slower when they behaved opti-
mally, i.e., when they avoided entrapment on an arrow tile 
( t = 0.36, SE = 0.08, t = 4.47, p < .001 ). In other words, 
participants with ASD were slowed down when they had to 
override the tendency to move in the same direction as their 
opponent because they thought they were being deceived.
This analysis also suggests that the significant main effect 
of behaviour is mostly due to the slowdown of participants 
with ASD when behaving optimally, and does not indicate 
an overall slowdown for optimal behaviour.
Discussion
It is often assumed that strategic deception requires taking 
another person’s epistemic perspective. Hence, given that 
people with ASD are thought to have important difficulties 
Fig. 4  Response times for 
optimal and suboptimal move-
ments. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals
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with perspective-taking (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995), one might 
expect that people with ASD also experience difficulties 
with strategic deception. Previous studies seem to confirm 
this hypothesis (Happé 1994; Williams et al. 2018). Both of 
these studies, however, relied on participants’ knowledge of 
social norms, which may have confounded the results.
This study measured the deceptive abilities of people with 
and without ASD in an experimental setting where the social 
demands were less stringent. Participants played a game 
against a computerised opponent in which either the oppo-
nent (Active phase) or the participants themselves (Passive 
phase) were unable to see the location of a treasure that had 
to be captured. Consequently, in the Active phase, one could 
deceive by steering the opponent onto one of the trap tiles 
that forced the opponent further away from the treasure. In 
Deception-C trials, deception was a prerequisite for captur-
ing the treasure; in Deception-S trials, deception merely led 
to a higher score. In the Passive phase, the opponent would 
routinely attempt to deceive the participant, and participants 
had to avoid entrapment—and hence avoid being deceived—
in order to reach an optimal outcome.
We found that participants with and without ASD were 
equally likely to deceive in Deception-C trials and equally 
likely to realise that they were being deceived during the 
Passive phase. In Deception-S trials, participants with ASD 
were even more likely to deceive than participants without 
ASD. An analysis of the confidence intervals around the 
parameter estimates indicated that the population difference 
between people with and without ASD was almost certain 
to be less than 10%. Even if a more highly-powered study 
is able to detect such subtle differences, they nevertheless 
appear to challenge the idea that ASD is characterised by an 
impairment in the ability to take other people’s perspective.
However, an alternative explanation for the absence of 
an effect of ASD is that participants with ASD used socially 
learned strategies to compensate for their difficulties with 
perspective-taking, i.e., they derived regularities from 
observed behaviour and reasoned about those regularities to 
mimic perspective-taking (e.g., Livingston et al. 2019). Cru-
cially, the use of such socially learned strategies is thought 
to be more deliberate and cumbersome than perspective-
taking in people without ASD (e.g., Dean et al. 2017; Hull 
et al. 2017).
The distinction between perspective-taking and socially 
learned strategies has also been invoked in studies on false-
belief reasoning. In the standard false-belief task, partici-
pants watch a character place, e.g., a marble in a basket. 
Unbeknownst to the character, the marble is moved to a dif-
ferent location (Wimmer and Perner 1983). Afterwards, par-
ticipants are asked where they think the character will look 
for the marble, which requires them to take the perspective 
of the character. High-functioning people with ASD mostly 
give the correct answer to the false-belief question, even 
though they start doing so at a significantly older age than 
people without ASD (e.g., Happé 1995).
However, various studies suggest that people with ASD 
who pass the false-belief task use a different, less automatic 
and more cumbersome strategy than people without ASD 
to solve the task (e.g., Begeer et al. 2003; Senju 2012; Som-
mer et al. 2018). For example, eye-tracking research shows 
that, when watching the false-belief story unfold, people 
with ASD tend to look at the location where the marble is, 
whereas people without ASD tend to look at the location 
where the character thinks the marble is (Senju 2012). Simi-
larly, fMRI research shows that people with ASD recruit 
a broader network of brain areas to solve the false-belief 
task, suggesting increased cognitive demands (Sommer et al. 
2018). As in the case of deception, then, the literature shows 
that people with and without ASD may solve the false-belief 
task in different ways: either by automatic perspective-taking 
or by a conscious and effortful compensatory strategy.
The results of our experiment provide two pieces of 
evidence suggesting that participants with ASD adopted 
socially learned strategies. First, participants with ASD 
showed a significantly stronger learning effect, such that 
they were initially less likely to deceive, but became equally 
likely to deceive towards the end of the game. Moreover, 
people with ASD were better able to transfer their deceptive 
abilities among different deception-consequences than peo-
ple without ASD: from urgent instances in which deception 
was a precondition for obtaining the treasure to less urgent 
instances in which deception merely led to a higher score. 
Second, it took participants with ASD significantly longer 
to realise that they were being deceived when compared to 
participants without ASD. That is, in the Passive phase, par-
ticipants were slower to move when they realised that they 
were being deceived.
Based on these observations, it may plausibly be argued 
that participants with ASD (successfully) used a differ-
ent type of strategy to pass the experiment, i.e., a strategy 
that involves conscious and effortful reasoning about the 
regularities that they observed throughout the experiment. 
Notice, however, that these compensatory strategies were 
only partially visible: the increased learning effect was only 
observed when participants actively deceived; the increased 
response times when participants had to detect deception.
This study highlights the importance of distinguishing 
theoretically and empirically different ways in which peo-
ple may engage in deception: either through perspective-
taking or through social learning of causes and effects. This 
aetiological ambiguity generally makes it difficult to draw 
firm conclusions from the ability to strategically deceive 
to the ability to engage in perspective-taking (e.g., Byrne 
and Whiten 1991, 1992; Dennett 1978). However, we have 
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shown that a more careful analysis of learning patterns and 
response times may distinguish the various mechanisms that 
underlie deception.
One may worry that, since participants played against a 
computerised opponent, deception in this particular setting 
did not draw upon perspective-taking abilities. Indeed, while 
people without ASD readily attribute beliefs and intentions 
to inanimate objects (e.g., Gergely and Csibra 2003), people 
with ASD have been found to do so less frequently (Castelli 
et al. 2002) or at least less successfully (Abell et al. 2000). 
At the same time, however, it has been found that people 
with ASD perform comparably in computerised and non-
computerised versions of the false-belief task, suggesting 
that they are equally likely to engage in perspective-taking in 
both modalities. In addition, people with and without ASD 
may behave differently in more socially embedded experi-
mental settings, e.g., because of people with ASD experienc-
ing social anxiety or people without ASD being more moti-
vated to perform well in such contexts (e.g., Chevallier et al. 
2014). Hence, our computerised game may have offered a 
more neutral testing ground to compare the deceptive abili-
ties of people with and without ASD.
Another concern is to extend our results to the deceptive 
abilities that individuals with ASD may display in real-life 
situations. Unlike the well-defined confines of our com-
puterised game, real-life deception involves a complex and 
indeterminate interplay of social norms and verbal and non-
verbal behaviour (e.g., Dennis et al. 2000; Ekman 1985; Vrij 
et al. 2000). It is well known that people with ASD have 
problems interpreting such norms and cues (e.g., Baron-
Cohen et al. 1999, 1997). Therefore our results should not 
be construed as implying that people with and without ASD 
are equally likely to deceive across the board—as indeed 
the studies of Happé (1994) and Williams et al. (2018) have 
already provided evidence against.
While it is incontrovertible that deception in everyday 
life heavily draws upon knowledge of social interactions, 
deception per se is a fundamental cognitive ability whose 
presence or absence is a matter of considerable theoretical 
interest, which is ultimately divorced from the question of 
how successfully one can make use of deception in social 
interactions. We have shown that, at least in principle, peo-
ple with ASD are equally good—and in some cases even 
better—at deceiving and detecting deception than people 
without ASD. Thus, our study suggests that the problems 
that people with ASD experience with deception are likely 
due to their problems with the representation of social infor-
mation rather than to a deficit in the ability to strategically 
deceive.
Of course, it remains an open question whether people 
with ASD would perform similarly when they would engage 
with people instead of computerised opponents—we aim to 
address this question in future research. What the results of 
the current study convincingly show, however, is that people 
with and without ASD are equally well-versed in the logic 
of deception (to borrow a phrase from one of our reviewers), 
at least in settings that do not draw upon rich knowledge of 
social interaction.
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